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Case No. 7 650 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLADYS E. HAMILTON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY C·ORPORA-
TION, KENNETH J. PINNEY, 
doing business as PINNEY BEV-
ERAGE CO niP ANY, and PROVO 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was disposed of by the Trial Court at 
the pre-trial hearing. The positions of the parties were 
there taken and stated, and thereupon the Trial Court 
reached the conclusion that Plaintiff was not entitled 
to recover. The findings of the Court in its pre-trial 
order, give the basic elements upon which the parties 
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relied. Since the Court disposed of the case by con-
cluding that whatever duty the City may have been 
under to furnish protection to Plaintiff, it discharged 
such duty by providing the protective screen described 
in the findings and revealed in the photographs of the 
screen, introduced in evidence as Exhibits 1, 2 ~d 3, 
and that the Plaintiff assumed any risk involved of 
inadequate protection, we shall confine our statement 
of facts to those facts having a bearing upon these legal 
propositions. Therefore, such questions as to whether 
the City, in the maintenance and conduct of Derk's Field, 
was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, 
or whether it had ·any responsibility to Plaintiff at all 
since it was a lessor, or as an owner who had permitted 
others to use its property and to whom it had surren-
dered control, or what its relationship to the ball clubs 
and hence to Plaintiff was, are purposely not considered 
in our brief. 
Defendant owns Derk's Field and constructed a 
baseball park thereon with a grandstand and bleachers. 
It erected a mesh wire screen in front of the grand-
stand, about 35 feet back from home base. The screen 
is 32 feet high and 150 feet long. Defendant permitted 
the use of the park by two baseball teams sponsored by 
Pinney Beverage Comp·any and Provo City Baseball 
Club. These teams played in the park on the evening 
of July 9, 1947. Plaintiff paid the admission charge to 
the game and selected a seat about 15 feet behind the 
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3 
sereen and in the center of the screened portion of the 
grandstand. In the 14th inning a foul ball went over 
the sereen and came down inside the screen, striking 
Plaintiff on the back and base of her ne.ck, causing the 
injuries for 'Yhich this action is brought. 
It is apparent from the Court's finding, paragraph 
5, "rhich also follows the language of Plaintiff's claim 
filed 'vith the City, in evidence as Exhibit 'A', and Com-
plaint, that Plaintiff was well avvare of the fact that to 
watch a baseball game involved some danger to spec-
tators from batted or thrown balls. She alleges, and 
the Court finds, that she "selected a seat about 15 feet 
behind and in the center of the screened portion of the 
grandstand, which she considered and assumed to be, 
and which she selected as being in a place of safety, 
where she could not be injured by batted or thrown 
balls." This clearly indicates that she was well aware 
that there were hazards involved in watching the game 
from batted and thrown balls. It further indicates that 
she saw the screen; was aware of its nature and height 
and that there was no overhead coverage as the screen 
was plainly visible before her and was there to be seen. 
To her the screen appeared sufficient to protect her. 
She deliberately chose a seat behind it, having passed 
judgment as to its adequacy as a protection to her. 
There is no allegation, nor is there any finding in 
the pre-trial order, that this desire of the Plaintiff to 
be seated in a place which would afford her absolute 
protection against balls was ever communicated to any-
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one connected with the Defendant or the management 
of the hall field at any time. From all that appears in 
the case this was simply her own unexpressed thinking, 
of which she alone was aware. Had she made known her 
desire to sit in a fully covered spot, she could have used 
the press box in the top of the grandstand shown on 
Exhibit 1, wh~ch has a roof and is entirely enclosed. 
There is no. evidence that .that place was not available. 
Nor is there anything in the record to show that 
any representations were made to Plaintiff by anyone 
as to the screen being sufficient to intercept and prevent 
every ball from falling back of it or at the place where 
the Plaintiff sat. All that the record shows is that the 
screen was there plainly visible; its nature could readily 
be seen as the photographs show. She knew it was 
there. No one, therefore, misled or influenced her in 
any·way in her selection of the seat she chose. In assum-
ing she was selecting a place of absolute safety she 
relied solely on her own judgment with the physical 
conditions fully visible and apparent. No one but herself 
knew why she made the selection she did or how she 
came to conclude that she was in ·a place of absolute 
safety. 
There is no allegation or elai~ that she was in-
capable of arriving at a judgment of the hazards involved 
in view of the type of screen there before her. It is 
not claimed that she was ignorant of the hazards or 
that she had never before seen a baseball game. On the 
contrary, as already pointed out, she well knew there 
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were hazards and she relied solely upon her own judg-
ment in selerting ""hat she considered to be a safe place. 
Her selection was made ""ith the physical facts plainly 
apparent to anyone "~ho n1ight look. 
On the question of negligence, Plaintiff's position 
is stated by the Trial Court, Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the 
findings as follo,Ys : 
"6. That Plaintiff claims in this case that 
Salt Lake City Corporation was negligent in its 
construction and maintenance of the Ball Park, 
and in authorizing and permitting the use thereof 
while not having a screen in front of said grand-
stand and Plaintiff's seat, of sufficient height or 
of sufficient overhead covering so as to prevent 
batted balls from going over said screen and 
striking Plaintiff, and in permitting Plaintiff to 
be injured by a batted ball after being lulled 
into a sense of security by reason of the screen; 
and that the negligence of the Defendant City 
proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries. 
"7. That Plaintiff further claims that in the 
operation of said Ball Park, it was the duty of 
the City to have a reasonable number of pro-
tected seats so that those patrons, including Plain-
tiff, who desired a protected seat, could select 
such a protected seat, where they, and she, would 
be in a place of safety and a place where they, 
and she, would be protected from injury." 
This position so stated by the Court in Paragraph 
6 above follows almost identically the allegations of 
negligence in Plaintiff's claim, Exhibit 'A', and in her 
Complaint. It is thus apparent that Plaintiff's action 
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is not based upon a failure of the City to exercise reason-
able care to afford reasonable protection to spectators 
in screening the grandstand. It is based upon the 
proposition that it was the Defendant's duty to provide 
Plaintiff a place of absolute safety and immunity against 
the hazards naturally incident to a baseball game; that 
Plaintiff, having observed there was a screen in front 
of her, had the right to assume that that screen would 
absolutely prevent any ball from reaching her and so 
she had no risk to assume. Plaintiff's position is that 
the City was bound to erect a screen of sufficient height 
or an ove-rhead covering that would prevent balls from 
going over the screen and falling in the grandstand 
where she was sitting. In other words, it is clear that 
Plaintiff attempts to recover in this action upon the 
basis that the City was an insurer of her safety when 
she chose a seat in the grandstand back of the screen. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
THE CITY AS THE OWNER OF DERK'S FIELD IS 
NOT AN INSURER OF THE PERSONS ATTENDING 
BASEBALL GAMES. 
II. 
THE CITY DISCHARGED ANY DUTY WHICH IT 
OWED TO PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE BY PROVIDING 
THE SCREEN SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
III. 
WHATEVER DANGER TO PLAINTIFF EXISTED FROM 
FOUL BALLS GOING UP OVER THE SCREEN WAS AS 
OBVIOUS TO HER AS TO DEFENDANT, AND SHE 
ASSUl\1ED THE RISK INCIDENT THERETO. 
IV. 
THAT THERE ARE DANGERS INHERENT IN BASE-
BALL GAMES IS A MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
AND P LA IN T I F F WAS, UNDER THE EVIDENCE, 
CHARGED WITH SUCH KNOWLEDGE AND BOUND TO 
TAKE NOTICE THEREOF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CITY AS THE OWNER OF DERK'S FIELD IS 
NOT AN INSURER OF T'HE PERSONS ATTENDING 
BASEBALL GAMES. 
In view of the conclusion reached by the Trial 
Court that the Defendant discharged its duty to Plain-
tiff in providing the screen it did, we do not desire in 
this appeal to attempt a statement of the precise duty, 
if any, which Defendant owed Plaintiff in this case. 
The fact is the Defendant owned the ball park, but at 
the time of Plaintiff's injury it was being used by two 
(2) semi-pro ball teams under an arrangement with 
Defendant for its use. Just what the relationship was 
between Defendant and the ball clubs was not decided. 
The Trial Court simply found, for the purposes of the 
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pre-trial proceeding, that the Defendant leased the ball 
field to the two (2) teams, but left the matter open for 
further evidenc~ in the event of a reversal by the appel-
late court. For the purpose of its decision, the Trial 
Court concluded that whatever duty Defendant owed 
to Plaintiff to furnish a protected seat, it discharged 
that duty by providing the protective screen described 
in the findings. It was clear to the Trial Court, and 
it was frankly admitted by Plaintiff's counsel, that 
Plaintiff's action was predicated upon the legal premise 
that it was Defendant's duty to furnish absolute pro-
tection to Plaintiff from batted or thrown balls by pro-
viding her with a seat where no ball could reach her at 
any time under any conditions. And, further, that she 
had a right to assume that the screen provided by the 
Defendant was of such structure and nature as to pre-
vent any ball from reaching her in the course of the 
game, which would relieve her of any assumption of 
risk. 
That the owner or user of a ball park is not an 
insurer of the safety of the persons attending a baseball 
game is held by all the authorities, including those 
cited by· Plaintiff. Counsel for Plaintiff now seems to 
concede this proposition for he apparently abandons 
the position stated as his position by the Trial Court 
in Paragraph 6 of his findings, above quoted, and now, 
for the first time, in his brief takes the position that 
Defendant's duty did not extend beyond the furnishing 
of seats that "were reasonably protected from foul 
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balls.''-(Page 1-t of Plaintiff's brief). He goes on to 
assert that the fact that a foul ball fell at a place 15 
feet back of the screen indicates that there were no seats 
"reasonably safe~' or safe as a matter of law. 
' 
\\ ... e shall cite a few of the authorities to illustrate 
the proposition stated under Point I. 
38 Am. Jur. Sec. 92 pp. 751-52, states: 
"An owner's liability to such persons for 
injuries not intentionally inflicted must be predi-
cated upon negligence; and the owner, as such, 
is not an insurer against accidents upon the 
premises, even as to persons whom he had invited 
to enter." 
Edling vs. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition 
Co., 181 ~Io. App. 327, 168 S.W. 908, a case where the 
ball went through a hole in the screen about a foot 
square, the screen being old, worn, and rotten, the 
Court says: 
"One of the natural risks encountered by 
spectators of a professional baseball game is 
that of being struck by a foul ball, and it goes 
without saying that Defendant was not required 
by law, and it did not undertake, to insure the 
patrons of the screened-in portion of its grand-
stand immunity against injury from such source; 
but being in the business of providing public 
entertainment for profit, Defendant was bound 
to exercise reasonable care to protect its patrons 
against such injury." 
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Curtis vs. Portland Baseball Club, 130 Ore. 93, 
279 P. 277, in which a spectator behind the screen was 
struck by a foul ball curving around the end of the 
screen far enough into the grandstand to strike Plaintiff. 
It was contended that the Defendant should have had 
wings at the end of the screen. The Court said : 
"It (Defendant) was not, however, an insurer 
of their safety. It was required to use only that 
degree of care exercised by persons of ordinary 
prudence and caution engaged in similar busi-
ness." 
Hudson vs. Kansas City Baseball Club, 164 S.W. 
2d 318. Here Plaintiff assumed he was sitting in a 
screened portion, having asked for the best reserve 
seat. He was sitting, however, in an unscreened portion 
of the grandstand. The Court says: 
"Conversely, and as applied to a place of 
public amusement as well as to a place of busi-
ness, the invitor is not an insurer of the safety 
of the invitee. Neither is the invitee protected 
against all hazard, nor relieved of all duty to 
himself for his own safety and to the extent that 
the duty of 'protection rests upon the invitee, 
the duty of the invitor to protect is reduced. The 
extent of these relative duties depends upon many 
factors involving the capacity and opportunity 
of the invitor to protect the invitee and the capa-
city and opportunity of the invitee to protect 
himself.' Ivory vs. Cincinnati Baseball Club Co., 
62 Ohio Ap. 514, 518, 24 N.E. 2d, 837, 839." 
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Pollan vs. City of Dotham, 8 So. 2d 813: This case 
involv.ed the sufficiency of the Complaint to state a cause 
of action. The foul ball "~ent through a hole in the 
screen. The Court says: 
"There is an absence of averments of negli-
gence in either Counts I or II or statement of 
fact sho,Ying a duty o"\ving by either of the De:.. 
fendants to Plaintiff and a breach thereof. The 
pleader, in drawing these Counts, apparently 
proceeded on the idea that the Defendant muni-
cipal corporation, because of the leasehold were 
insurers of the safety of persons entering as 
invitees, and that they were therefore liable for 
Plaintiff's personal injury, by negligence. That 
is not the law. City of Bir·mingham vs. Carle, 
191 Ala. 539, 68 So. 22 L.R.A. 1916 F. 797." 
POINT II. 
THE CITY DISCHARGED ANY DUTY WHICH IT 
OWED TO PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE BY PROVIDING 
THE SCREEN SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff took the position that it was the duty of 
the Defendant to provide either a screen of sufficient 
height that no foul ball could go over it, or Defendant 
should have provided an over-head covering or roof 
over the grandstand in addition to the upright screen. 
No case is cited to sustain such view and no case can 
be found which will support it, for, as already pointed 
out, such a proposition is tantamount to making Defend-
ant an insurer of the safety of those seated in the 
grandstand. Nor does Plaintiff cite any case or authority 
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to sustain Plaintiff's new position, asserted for the first 
time in her brief, namely, that the screen provided 
did not furnish reasonable protection to Plaintiff. In 
view of Plaintiff's new position involving "reasonable 
protection" instead of absolute protection, as contended 
for in her claim and Complaint and before the Trial 
Court at the pre-trial reflected in Paragraph 6 of the 
Court's findings, it might be well here to inquire as to 
how high should the screen be to afford reasonable 
protection~ Again, at what height above the height of 
Defendant's screen would an upright screen be con-
sidere9. inadequate and so require an over-head pro-
tective covering to supplement it~ For admittedly there 
is a ·limit to the height a screen could be built to stand 
the stress of storms or other forces and yet be open 
enough to permit spectators a reasonably unobstructed 
view of the game. It is common lmowledge that foul 
balls frequently attain a height of 100 feet or more and 
sometimes go so high as to be almost lost to sight. 
Plaintiff cites three (3) cases. The first case·, Crane 
vs. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App. 
301, 153 S.W. 1076, involved a case where Plaintiff 
was injured while sitting in an area unprotected by a 
screen while protected seats were available. It was held 
that Plaintiff could not recover. The Court was not, 
therefore, attempting to define what kind of a screen 
would, in law, be adequate to discharge the owner's 
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duty to spectators. It Inerely said there should be 
seats provided 'vhich 'vere protected by screening, the 
one there involved evidently being an upright one. 
The case of Edling 'VS. Kansas City Baseball and 
Exhibition Co .. 181 Thfo .. A .. pp. 327, 168 S.W. 908, from 
which "~e have quoted, involved an upright screen that 
had a hole in it one foot square. The Court there held 
the Defendant was not an insurer; that it was Defend-
ant's duty to keep the screen free from defects, and if it 
allowed to secreen to become defective with holes and 
rotten, that constituted negligence. As to such negli-
gence the Plaintiff did not assume the risk in seating 
himself behind the screen. 
In Quinn vs. Recreation Park Association, 3 Cal. 
2d 725, 46 P. 2d 144, a 14-year old girl wanted a screened 
seat near first base. There being none available, she 
was ushered to an unscreened section near first base. 
She was struck by a foul ball. There is no description 
of the screen in the opinion. The seats in the grand-
stand are spoken of as "screened seats." But the Court 
does say that the duty "imposed by law is performed 
when screened seats are provided." It further holds 
that the "management is not required, nor does it 
undertake to insure patrons against injury from such 
sources (batted or thrown balls). All that is required 
is the exercise of reasonable care to protect patrons 
against such injuries." The Court held Plaintiff assumed 
the risk of sitting where she did. Certainly this case 
is no authority for Plaintiff's position. 
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In Leek vs. Tacoma Baseball Club, ______ Wash., 229 
P. 2d 329, the precise propositions relied upon by Plain-
tiff in this appeal were disposed of contrary to Plain-
tiff's position and in complete harmony with the Trial 
Court's ruling. In that case Leek purchased a grand-
stand ticket and entered the park about 8 :00 p.m. It 
was then twilight and the flood lights h·ad not yet been 
turned on. His seat was directly behind home plate in 
the fourth row from the front. It was behind a vertical 
wire screen 26 feet high and 34 feet wide. Th~ grand-
stand was not roofed and there was no overhead screen. 
Leek did not look to see if there was any overhead pro-
tection and he had never before been in this ball park. 
A short time after he had taken his seat, the batter 
hit a high foul into this section of the grandstand. 
Leek watched the ball start up, but lost sight of it in 
the twilight haze. He turned around, and just then the 
ball struck him in the head, rendering him unconscious. 
He was a man 65 years old, a carpenter by trade. He 
had played hall as a boy and had seen games infre-
quently since that time. He wore glasses and had 
normal vision. An officer of the Defendant testified that 
five to eight balls dropped into the stands at every game; 
that it was not unusual for these fouls to drop into the 
stands immediately behind the home plate. The only 
question presented on appeal was whether under these 
facts Plaintiff was entitled to recover. The case was 
dismissed by the Trial Court on Defendant's motion at 
the close of Plaintiff's case. The judgment of the lower 
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Court \Yas affir1ned. The Plaintiff contended that De-
fendant HproYided no seats \Yhich 'vere effectively screen-
ed, and that there \Yas accordingly a failure of the pro-
prietor to perforn1 his established duty of providing 
some screened seats." The Court refers to some cases, 
including the Crane case and the Quinn case, supra, 
relied upon by Plaintiff in the instant case, which state 
that it is the duty of the proprietor to furnish some 
screened seats. The question is stated by the Court as 
follows: 
"Did the proprietor, in providing a perpen-
dicular screen 26 feet high in front of the seats 
immediately behind home plate, fulfill his duty to 
provide some screened seats, or was it necessary 
to also provide overhead protection for such 
seats?" 
The Court points out that there were no precedents 
precisely on the factual situation and so resorts to gen-
eral principles, stating them as follows: 
"Lacking a precedent on the factual situa-
tion, we turn to general principles. Basic in the 
law of negligence is the tenet that the duty to 
use care is predicated upon knowledge of danger, 
and the care which must be used in any par-
ticular situation is in proportion to the actor's 
knowledge, actual or imputed, of the danger to 
another in the act to be performed. Burr v. 
Clark, 30 Wash. 2d 149, 190 P. 2d 769; 38 Am. 
Jur. 678, Negligence, P. 32; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, 
P. 5, p. 351. 
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"This principle is an integral part of the law 
relating to the liability of owners or occupants 
of premises. Generally speaking, the possessor 
of land is liable for injuries to a business visitor 
caused by a condition· encountered on the prem-
ises only if he (a) knows or should have known 
of such condition and that it involved an unrea-
sonable risk; (b) has no reason to believe that 
the visitor will discover the condition or realize 
the risk ; and (c) fails to make the condition 
reasonably safe or to warn th~ visitor so that 
the latter may avoid the harm.-Rudson v. Kansas 
City Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W. 2d 
318, 142 A.L.R. 858; 2 Restatement of Torts 938, 
P. . 343 ; 38 Am. J ur ~ 7 54, Negligence, P. 96 ; 65 
C.J. S·., Negligence, P. 45, p. 521. 
"Respondent baseball club, of course, knew 
that the seats immediately behind home plate 
were not provided with overhead protection. But 
did respondent have reason to believe that this 
lack of overhe,ad protection involved an "unrea-
sonable risk" of injury to the patrons~ 
"This would seem to be a jury question, had 
there been a jury. There was no jury, and the 
cause was dismissed at the close of appellant's 
case, so that no findings of fact are before us. 
It is therefore a question which we must deter-
mine de novo, on the basis of the plaintiff's evi-
dence, summarized above. · 
"In our opinion, under the facts· of this 
case, respondent did not have reason to believe 
that the lack of overhead protection involved 
an unreasonable risk of injury to appellant. It 
was not uncommon for foul balls to drop over the 
vertical screen into this section of the stand. 
However, there is nothing in the record, aside 
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from this one incident, or in co1nmon experience, 
to indicate that foul balls of this kind cause 
serious injuries "'"ith sufficient frequency to be 
considered an unreasonable risk. 
·~so-called foul tips, going into adjacent 
stands ''~thout gaining any considerable eleva .. 
tion, are kno\vn to be dangerous, because their 
speed makes avoidance difficult and serious in-
jury more likely. Foul balls which go high 
enough to clear a twenty-six-foot screen, ho\v-
ever (and the ball in question apparently went 
much higher), take longer to reach the seats, 
and are therefore easier to dodge or catch. If 
unsuccessful in this, the spectator is usually not 
seriously injured, because the driving force of 
the ball is gone and there is left only the force 
of gravitation. The fact that in this case a serious 
injury did result is not controlling. The question 
is whether the proprietor had reason to believe, 
before the accident happened, that lack of over-
head protection would unreasonably endanger 
appellant. 
"While the baseball cases cited above do 
not involve factual situations similar to the case 
before us, several of them, in discussing the neces-
sity of screening some seats, employ reasoning 
which lends support to the views expressed above. 
Thus, in Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Ath-
letic Ass'n, it is stated that "the perils are not 
so imminent" (122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W. 708) that 
due care on the part of the management requires 
all the spectators to be screened in. In Grimes 
v. American League Baseball Club, Mo. App., 
78 S.W. 2d 520, 523, the court said that "the 
perils of the game are not so great" as to require 
the screening of all seats. In Curtis v. Portland 
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Baseball Club, where the plaintiff contended that 
a foul ball had curved around the end of a 
screen, the court held that the accident was one 
which "could not reasonably have been antici-
pated." (130 Ore. 93, 279 P. 278.) In Cincinnati 
Baseball Club v. Eno, it was said that the pro--
prietor had the duty not to lead its invited guests 
"into unusual dangers."-(112 Ohio St. 175, 14"7 
N.E. 88.) In Hull v. Oklahoma City Baseball 
Co., 196 Okl. 40, 163 P. 2d 982, 984, the court 
absolved the defendant on the ground that "there 
was no unreasonable risk" not appreciated by 
the plaintiff as spectator. · 
"Applying any of these quoted tests as to 
the duty to provide protective screening, we 
conclude that respondent was not, with respect 
to appellant, under a duty to provide overhead 
protection on the occasion in question. 
"Appellant further argues however, that hav-
ing undertaken to provide some screening for 
the -seats in question, the proprietor impliedly 
assured the spectators who paid for admission 
to the screened grandstand that seats behind 
the screen were reasonably protected from the 
known hazards of the game. In support of this 
proposition, appellant cites Wells v. Minneapolis 
Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, supra, and Edling v. 
Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 181 Mo. 
App. 327, 168 S.W. 908. 
"In the Wells case, the screen extended to 
the grandstand roof. The plaintiff claimed to 
have been seated ten feet within the ar~a behind 
the screen, but that a foul ball curved around 
the end of the screen and struck her. Holding 
for the defendant as a matter of law, the court 
stated, among other things, that where the pro-
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prietor undertakes to screen, the screen must be 
·reasonably sufficient as to extent and substance.' 
No question was presented as to whether this 
required overhead protection, the court simply 
ruling that lateral screening was adequate under 
the facts of the case. In the Edling case, the 
plaintiff, 'Yhile sitting in a screened section imme-
diately behind home plate, was struck by a foul 
ball which passed through a large hole in the 
'vire netting. It was in this connection that the 
court, in sustaining a verdict for the plaintiff, 
stated that the proprietor "impliedly assured 
spectators" (181 Mo. App. 327, 168 S.W. 909) 
who paid for admission to the grandstand that 
seats behind the screen were reasonably pro-
tected. 
"We are in f11ll agreement with the rule as 
announced in these cases. It must be apparent, 
however, that this implied assurance of protec-
tion has reference only to those hazards against 
which the screen is obviously designed to pro-
tect. Just as the screening of seats in the Wells 
case was held not to constitute an implied assur-
ance that foul halls would not curve around the 
end of the screening, so here, the twenty-six-foot 
vertical screen gives rise to no assurance that 
foul balls may not go over the top of the screen 
and drop into the stands. It is true that the 
curving of a foul ball around the end of the 
screen is a highly improbable occurrence, while 
the dropping of fouls behind vertical screens 
is relatively frequent. The point is, however, 
that in each case the obvious limits of the pro-
tection afforded is open and apparent to all 
patrons, and in no sense constitutes a trap for 
the unwary. 
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"We have in mind, of course, that appellant 
here did not actually know that there was no 
overhead screening, and assumed that such pro-
tection was provided. Appellant's failure to 
observe what was plainly there to be observed 
cannot, however, operate to enlarge respondent's 
duty of care beyond that which it would otherwise 
be. The proprietor was entitled to assume that 
patrons walking into the grandstand would note 
that there was no roof, and hence nothing to which 
ove-rhead screening could attach. 
"A somewhat similar contention was ad-
vanced in Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 
349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W. 2d 318, 142 A.L.R. 858, 
the plaintiff there claiming that he was under 
the impression that there was screening between 
him and home plate. In affirming a judgment for 
the defendant, the court said: "* * * A business 
invitee may not recover for a condition as well 
known to him as it is to his invitor and neither 
may he impose liability on the owner or proprie-
tor by failing and neglecting to see and observe 
that which is perfectly open and obvious to a 
person in possession of his faculties. (Citing 
cases.)" 349 Mo. at page 1226, 164 S.W. 2d at 
page 324. 
"In our opinion, respondent is not liable to 
appellant on any theory that the presence of 
the vertical screen constituted an implied assur-
ance to appellant that overhead protection was 
provided, or was unnecessary." 
Jones vs. Alexandria Baseball .Ass'n., ______ La. App. 
~-----, 50 So. 2d 93, plaintiff alleges he paid the admis-
sion fee to the ball game and seated himself in the 
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second row. of one of the bleacher sections behind a 
wire screen 10 feet high. To the rear and left of plain-
tiff 'vas a pole from 'vhich the lights for night games 
were controlled. A foul ball cleared the screen but 
struck this pole, eausing the bail to ricochet therefrom 
and striking plaintiff. Plaintiff watched it clear the 
screen and go over his head, but watched it no farther. 
Plaintiff contended he 'vas entitled as a patron to assume 
that he was protected from hazards of the game at which 
he was an innocent spectator; that the pole was negli-
gently placed and constituted a hazard known to de-
fendant only and a danger to spectators. The Court 
held the petition failed to state a cause of action and 
said: 
"Plaintiff's petition discloses the fact that 
defendant had taken reasonable precautions to 
protect its patrons against ·any ordinary or ex-
pected hazards. To conclude that the defendant 
was required to protect its patrons against every 
possible danger or hazard would be, in effect, 
to declare it the insurer of all spectators at its 
games. It is only reasonable to consider that 
almost all sports events and exhibitions compre-
hend certain risks and elements of danger to 
spectators. Those who patronize such events must 
assume the risk of injury unless carelessness or 
negligence with respect to the neglect of reason-
able precautions is established." 
Curtis vs. Portland Baseball Club, 130 Ore. 93, 279 
P. 277. Plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal 
injuries sustained when he was struck by a foul bail 
while attending a baseball game. 
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"He testified, however, that the screen was 
directly in front of him and was about flush with 
his seat. His seat was about 60 feet from the 
batter's box and approximately 10 feet south of 
a line between third base and horne plate. It 
was on the second row, about 6 feet behind the 
screen, and on the extreme northern end. The 
screen covering the front of the grandstand was 
40 feet high and 150 feet long. Plaintiff says 
a foul-tipped ball, which had been pitched with 
great speed, curved around the end of the screen 
and struck him on the nose, :inflicting serious and 
permanent injuries. 
"Wherein was defendant derelict in its dutyf 
What did it fail to do which ought to have been 
done for the reasonable protection and safety 
of plaintiff who paid for a seat in the grandstand 
behind the screen~ Under the law, defendant 
was obliged to exercise reasonabie care and dili-
gence commensurate with the danger involved, to 
protect its patrons from injury. Plaintiff, in the 
absence of notice to the contrary, had the right to 
assume that defendant would exercise care in 
maintaining the premises in a reasonable safe 
condition. Being in the business of providing 
public entertainment for profit, the defendant was 
required to use due care to protect its patrons 
from injury. It was not, however, an insurer of 
· their safety. It was required to use only that 
degree of care exercised by persons of ordinary 
prudence and caution engaged in similar busi-
ness. It was not bound to guard against highly 
improbable dangers or perils. 
"Plaintiff says that a wing of the screen 
should have been extended back into the grand-
stand for a distance of 8 or 10 feet in order to 
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protect persons from foul balls. No court, so 
far as 've are a'vare, has ever held that it was 
the duty of a baseball park management to 
screen the entire grandstand nor to construct 
such ""'ings. Indeed, many peopie prefer to sit 
'vhere their vision is not obstructed by wire net-
ting. The defendant, in constructing 150 feet of 
screen and maintaining it in good condition, did 
its fu.ll duty in protecting patrons who might 
reasonably be expected to be hit by a foul ball. 
To hold that defendant should be obliged to erect 
a zringed screen as claimed by plaintiff would 
be subjecting it to a standard of care not war-
ranted by law. We fail to see wherein the defend-
ant has been remiss in its duty." 
POINT III. 
WHATEVER DANGER TO PLAINTIFF EXISTED FROM 
FOUL BALLS GOING UP OVER THE SCREEN WAS AS 
OBVIOUS TO HER AS TO DEFENDANT, AND SHE 
ASSUMED THE RISK INCIDENT THERETO. 
As already pointed out, Plaintiff's desire to sit in 
a seat affording absolute protection against batted or 
thrown balls, was not communicated to the Defendant. 
It was hidden in her own mind. The Defendant had 
a grandstand with a protective verlica;l screen 32 feet 
high and 150 feet long. A seat in this screened area 
was available to Plaintiff and she chose it, after passing 
judgment upon the protection which the screen there 
before her afforded. No one told her balls would not 
go up over the screen and fall in the area where she 
was seated. She was not misled by anything the De-
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fendant did or failed to do, with knowledge of the 
security which Plaintiff sought as a spectator. The 
screen was there visible for her to see, and it was per-
fectly obvious that there was no overhead covering. 
There was no entrapment or latent or hidden defects 
involved. 
The general principie governing the owner's liability 
to an invitee is stated in 38 Am. Jur. S-ec. 97, p. 757, as 
follows: 
"The liability of an owner or occupant to an 
invitee for negligence in failing to render the 
premises reasonably safe for the invitee, or in. 
failing to warn him of dangers thereon, must be 
predicated upon a superior knowledge concerning 
the dangers of the premises to persons going 
thereon. It is when the perilous instrumentality 
is known to the owner or occupant and not known 
to the person injured that a recovery is permitted. 
The orwner is liable to invited persons for injuries 
'occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land 
or its approaches, if such condition was known 
to him and not to them, and was negligently suf-
fered to exist, without timely notice to the public 
or to those who were likely to act upon such 
invitation.' 
"There is no liability for injuries from dan-
gers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or 
as well known to the person injured as they are 
to the owner or occupant." 
Hull vs. Oklahoma City Baseball Company, 163 P. 
2d 982. The Court says: 
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"Generally speaking, the possessor of land 
is liable to a visitor only if he knows of or should 
have known of a dangerous condition and realizes 
that it involves unreasonable risk and has no 
reason to believe that the plaintiff will disco¥er 
the condition and fails to warn the visitor so 
that the latter may avoid the harm. Restatement 
Torts, Sec. 343. 
"As we view the case, there was no unreason-
able risk not appreciated by the plaintiff as a 
spectator of the baseball game. As a consequence, 
the trial court was justified in determining upon 
failure to prove primary negligence." 
Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 164 'S.W. 
2nd 318. Plaintiff's complaint describes the typical base-
ball diamond and grandstand with-the grandstand seats 
immediately back of home plate protected by a wire 
netting or screen; that plaintiff asked for the best 
reserved seat, payed the admission fee, and was under 
the impression that he had secured a seat back of the 
wire netting. However, his seat was outside the netting. 
He alleges that the defendant was negligent in failing 
to protect with wire netting the grandstand lying be-
tween his seat and the batter's box, in offering for sale 
grandstand seats without notifying him whether they 
were protected by a wire netting, and offering for sale 
reserved seats which were not protected by the wire 
netting, giving plaintiff reason to believe that his seat 
would be protected by a wire netting, and giving him 
notice to the contrary. The court quotes as follo,vs from 
2 Restatement Law of Torts, Section 343, as follows: 
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" 'A possessor land is subject to liability for 
bodily harm caused to business visitors by a 
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only 
if, he (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable 
care could discover, the condition which, if known 
to him, he sho1tld realize as involving an unrea-
sonable risk to them, and (b) has no reason to 
believe that they will discover the condition or 
realize the risk involved therein, and (c) invites 
or permits them to enter or remain upon the land 
without exercising reasonable care (1) to make 
the condition reasonably safe, or ( 2) to give a 
warning adequate to enable them to avoid the 
harm.'" 
The Court continues: 
"In baseball the patrons participate in the 
sport as a spectator only, but in so doing subjects 
himself to the dangers necessarily and usually 
incident to and inherent in the game. This. does 
not mean that he 'assumes the risk' of being 
injured by the proprietor's negligence but that 
by voluntarily entering into the sport as a spec-
tator he knowingly accepts the reasonable risks 
and hazards inherent in and incident to the game. 
Bohlen, Studies in The Law of Torts, pp. 441-
444. 
"The rules governing the land proprietor's 
duty to his invitee presuppose that the possessor 
knows of the condition and 'has no reason to 
believe that they (his invitees) will discover the 
condition or realize the risk involved therein.' 
2 Restatement, Law of Torts, Sec. 343. The basis 
of the proprietor's liability is his superior knowl-
edge and if his invitee knows of the condition or 
hazard there is no duty on the part of the pro-
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prietor to warn him and there is no liability 
for result1~ng injury because the invitee has as 
much knowledge as the proprietor does and then 
by voluntarily acting, in view of his knowledge, 
assnnzes the risks and dangers incident to the 
known condition. State ex rei. First National 
Bank v. Hughes, 346 ~fo. 938, 144 S.W. (2d) 84; 
:Jiurray v. Ralph D'Oench Co., 347 Mo. 365, 147 
S.W. (2d) 623; Paubel v. Ritz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 
s.w. (2d) 369. 
"Neither do we think the plaintiff's alleged 
specia:l circumstances or his specific allegations 
of negligence aid him in this respect. A business 
invitee may not recover for a condition as well 
known to him as it is to his invitor and neither 
may he impose liability on the owner or proprie-
tor by failing and neglecting to see and observe 
that which is perfectly open and obvious to a 
person in possession of his faculties. Ilgenfritz 
v. Missouri P. & L. Co., 340 Mo. 648, 101 S.W. 
(2d) 723; Stoll v. First National Bank, 345 Mo. 
582, 134 S.W. (2d) 97; Mullen v. Sensenbrenner 
Mercantile Co., Mo. Supp. 260 S.W. 982, 33 A.L.R. 
176. 
Anderson vs. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W. 
2d 170, the Court quotes the restatement of 1aw of 
torts, quoted in the Hudson case, supra, and says: 
"There are no special circumstances alleged 
in the petition in the instant case which imposed 
upon defendant a duty to warn plaintiff against 
the dangers necessarily incident to the game she 
was attending and which did not result from 
negligence on the part of the defendant. The 
danger of balls being fouled into the stands is 
open and obvious to anyone who possesses normal 
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powers of observation. A knowledge of the rules 
or strategy of the game is not necessary to a 
realization of such hazard. Plaintiff does not 
allege that she communicated to Defendant her 
unawareness of the dangers involved in sitting 
in an unscreened portion of the stand." 
Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, ______ Cal. ______ , 222 
P. 2d 19. 
The Court states : 
"The applicable general principle is that the 
owner of property, insofar as an invitee is con-
cerned, is not an insurer of safety but must use 
reasonable care to keep his premises in a reason-
ably safe condition and give warning of latent 
or concealed perils. He is not liable for injury 
to an invitee resulting from a danger which was 
obvious or should have been observed in the 
exercise of reasonable care. Shanley v. American 
Olive Co., 185 Cal. 552, 555, 197 P. 793; Mautino 
v. Sutter Hospital Ass'n, 211 Cal. 556, 560, 296 
P. 76; Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas Co., 4 Cal. 2d 511, 
512, 50 P. 2d 801; Dingman v. A. F·. Mattock 
Co., 15 Cal. 2d 622, 624, 104 P. 2d 26. To the 
extent that the duty of self-protection rests upon 
the invitee, the duty of the invitor to protect is 
reduced. The extent of these relative duties de-
pends upon many factors involving the capacity 
and opportunity of the invitor to protect the in-
vitee and the capacity and opportunity of the 
invitee to protect himself. 
"In baseball, one of these factors is that the 
patron participates in the sport as a spectator 
and in so doing subjects himself to certain risks 
necessarily and usually incident to and inherent 
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in the game; risks that are obvious and should 
be observed in the exercise of reasonable care. 
This does not mean that he assumes the risk of 
being injured by the proprietor's negligence but 
that by voluntarily entering into the sport as a 
spectator he knowingly accepts the . reasonable 
risks and hazards inherent in and incident to the 
game." 
Shaw v. Boston American League Baseball Co., 
______ Mass. ______ , 90 N .E. 2nd 840: The C.ourt states the 
legal principles here pertinent as follows: 
" 'One maintaining a place of amusement who 
has invited the public to attend upon the payment 
of an admission fee is bound to exercise reason-
able care to keep the premises in a reasonably 
safe condition for their use, and to warn them 
against any dangers which he knows or ought 
to know they might encounter while upon the 
premises and which they reasonably could not 
be expected to know. * * * But no warning is 
required to be given to one who already has 
become apprized of the danger. or where the 
situation is so obvious that a person of ordina.ry 
intellligence would readily sense the likelihood 
of impending harm and would take active mea-
sures to avert it." 307 Mass. page 104, 29 N.E. 
2d page 718. To the same effect are Shanney v. 
Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 
168, 5 N.E. 2d 1, and cases therein cited. 
"Cases involving baseball have arisen in 
other jurisdictions and it has uniformly been 
held-and correctly we think-that a spectator 
familiar with the game assumes the reasonable 
risks and hazards inherent in the game. Hudson 
v. Kansas City Baseball Club, Inc., 349 Mo. 1215, 
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1224, 164 S.W. 2d 318, 142 A.L.R. 858; Crane v. 
Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. 
App. 301, 153 S.W. 1076; Kavafian v. Seattle 
Baseball Club Association; 105 Wash. 215, 219-
221, 177 P. 776, 181 P. 679; Brisson v. Minnea-
polis Baseball & Athletic Association, 185 Minn. 
507, 240 N.W. 903. See note in 142 A.L.R. 868 
et seq. And it is common knowledge that one of 
these hazards is the possibility of being hit by 
a foul ball." ' 
POINT IV. 
THAT THERE ARE DANGERS INHERENT IN BASE-
BALL GAMES IS A MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
AND P LA I N T I F F WAS, UNDER THE EVIDENCE, 
CHARGED WITH SUCH KNOWLEDGE AND BOUND TO 
TAKE NOTICE THEREOF. 
The proposition here stated is closely connected 
with the proposition discussed under Point III and some 
of the cases there sustain our Point IV. But as bearing 
specifically upon· this matter, we cite the following addi-
tional authorities: 
Blakeley vs. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118 
N.W. 482; The Court says: 
"It is knowledge common to all that in· these 
games hard halls are thrown and batted with 
great swiftness; that they are liable to be muffed, 
or batted, or thrown outside the lines of the 
diamond, and visitors standing in positions that 
may be reached by such balls have voluntarily 
placed themselves and with knowledge of the 
situation and may be held to assume the risk." 
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Quinn vs. Recreation Park Association, 46 P. 2d 
1-!-!, 3 Cal. 2nd 725. On the question of assumption of 
risk the Court says : 
"With respect to the law governing cases of 
this kind it has been generally heid that one of 
the natural risks assumed by spectators attend-
ing professional games is that of being struck 
by batted or thrown balls; that the management 
is not required, nor does it undertake to insure 
patrons against injury from such source. All 
that is required is the exercise of ordinary care 
to protect patrons." 
Brisson vs. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Asso-
ciation, 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903. Plaintiff was 
injured when struck with a foul ball while he was seated 
outside the screened part. He claims he was ignorant 
of the risks to which he was exposed by the game with 
which he said he was unfamiliar. As a smaU boy he 
had witnesses ball games and as an adult he had witness-
ed at least one league game. The Court says: 
"As said in the Ohio Case, above cited: 'The 
concensus of the above opinions is to the effect 
that it is common knowledge that in baseball 
games hard balls are thrown and batted with 
great swiftness, that they are liable to be thrown 
or batted outside the lines of the diamond, and 
that spectators in positions which may be reached 
by such balls assume the risk thereof. This theory 
is fortified by the fact that such spectators can 
watch the ball and can thus usually avoid being 
struck when a ball is directed toward them.' Does 
the plaintiff's asserted ignorance of the risk to 
which he was exposed take him outside of the 
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usual rule in regard to spectators in his situation 
at such games~ We are assuming it to be true 
that his knowledge of the game was such only 
as he had acquired by observation when he was 
young and by seeing the more recent league game, 
as well as the one he was then attending. In our 
opinion no adult of reasonable intelligence, even 
with the limited experience of the plaintiff, could 
fail to realize that he would be injured if he was 
struck by a thrown or batted ball, such as are 
used in league games of the character which he 
was observing, nor could he fail to realize that 
foul balls were likely to be directed toward where 
he was sitting. No one of ordinary intelligence 
could see many innings of the ordinary league 
game without coming to a full realization that 
batters cannot, and do not, control the direction 
of the ball which they strike and that foul tips 
or liners may go in an entirely unexpected direc-
tion. He could not hear the bat strike the ball 
many times without realizing that the ball wa$ 
a hard object. Even the sound of the contact o{ 
the ball with the gloves or m·itts of the players 
would soon apprize him of that. It is our opinion 
that the plaintiff, notwithstanding his alleged 
limited experience, must be held to have assumed 
the risk of the hazards to which he was exposed. 
"The order appealed from is reversed, and 
the case is remanded, with directions to the trial 
court to enter judgment for defendant notwith-
standing the verdict." 
CONCLUSION 
It is perfectly clear, from the authorities we have 
cited, that the Defendant was not an insurer of the 
Plaintiff's safety while she was seated in the grand-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
stand. It seems to be Plaintiff's position now, as re-
vealed in her brief, that the Defendant was required 
only to furnish a screen affording reasonable protec-
tion to Plaintiff from foul balls, but the mere fact that 
a foul ball reached her position back of the screen 
raises such an inference that the screen did not afford 
reasonable protection as to require submission to the 
jury, the question as to whether the screen afforded 
reasonable protection. The fa!llacy of such a position 
is apparent. Under it, either one of two alternatives 
must result: either the protection must be absolute so 
that no ball could, under any condition, reach the spec--
tator, in which event there would never be a law-suit, 
or there could be no instance where the ball happened 
to reach the spectator when the C-ourt could decide as 
a matter of law that the screen afforded such reason-
able protection as to discharge the owner's duty to the 
spectator. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff's position with respect to 
assumption of risk follows the same concept. While she 
now states that the duty of the owner is to furnish 
a screen affording reasonable p.rotection, she, never-
theless, when a screen is furnished, may assume she 
will he absolutely protected from foul balls, and if a 
foul ball reaches her, it is always a question for the 
jury to decide whether she was cognizant of and as-
sumed the risk of being struck by a foul ball. 
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We submit that on both propositions Plaintiff's 
position is untenable. There is no dispute as to the 
character of the screen; there is no claim that it was 
defective in any particular; it was perfectly visible to 
Plaintiff, and its nature,· height, and location were 
definitely shown and agreed upon before the Trial Court. 
So there is no additional evidence that could be given 
on these features, and there is no conflict of evidence 
as to any of them. It then became a question for the 
Court to determine, as a matter of law, whether the 
Defendant's duty to provide a screen affording reason-
able, not absolute, protection had been provided, and, 
further, whether Plaintiff assumed the risk. Under the 
facts before the Court, it could not do otherwise than 
hold against Plaintiff on both propositions. As to the 
assumption of risk, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the Trial Court was required to assume that 
Plaintiff was of age and was a woman of ordinary intel-
ligence; that she had ordinary vision and saw what was 
perfectly obvious and apparent to be seen; that she 
had knoWledge that baseballs are hard and might be 
batted in any direction with speed or at considerable 
height; that she knew a person struck by a ball might 
sustain injury; and that she knew a game of baseball 
involved some hazard to spectators from batted or 
thrown balls, which the Courts all say is common knowl-
edge. 
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Under such conditions it became a question of law 
as to whether Plaintiff was entitled to recover. Under 
Plaintiff's theory Defendant was an insurer of her 
safety. We have demonstrated that such is not the 
law. When all the facts are undisputed, it is for the 
Trial Court to say, as a matter of law, whether under 
such facts the case should be submitted to the jury. 
And we earnestly submit that under the facts of this 
case Plaintiff was not entitled to recover; first, because 
the Defendant discharged its duty to her as a spectator, 
and second, because she assumed whatever risk was 
involved in sitting where she did. The judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney, 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistant City Attorneys, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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________________________ copies of the foregoing brief received 
this ________________________ day of June, 1951. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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